Case Analysis Effectiveness

Communicating the detailed points of an area of study can be a challenging task. Developing sound methods and collecting research data for in-depth review can be time consuming and potentially costly. A targeted study may be the preferred means of building the body of knowledge on a topic or area of focus. Unfortunately, this type of in-depth study is not always feasible. A case study or analysis may often meet the requirement to strengthen knowledge in a particular area without burdening the researcher with unnecessary extra work. 

The time allotted to conducting research may limit options for gathering data on a subject. For shorter timelines, a case analysis allows a researcher to study and area without the need to design a complex experiment or survey. One of the key benefits of case analysis is their inherent flexibility. It is due to this flexibility, researchers often prefer to conduct a case analysis prior to developing more extensive research as a means to direct efforts (Murphy, 2014). Another advantage of a case analysis is the ability to capture the realistic results not influenced by testing in a controlled environment. The undesirable variables of “real life” may often play a significant role in shaping outcome. For that reason, case analyses can be argued as more directly applicable. 

Case analyses are not without drawbacks. Since they rely on events or previously conducted research, the findings may be too generalized to offer substance. Additionally, it may be difficult to replicate the findings which limits the their effectiveness as a means to corroborate an idea (The Strengths and Weaknesses of Case Studies, n.d.). And not to be overlooked, research bias may play a significant factor on selecting the available literature and data. 

For the purpose of expanding knowledge base, the case analysis an effective teaching tool. From the perspective of an aviation safety professional, they can be one of the most useful tools in their figurative “tool box.” Using caution to avoid the pitfalls associated with case analyses is, of course, a critical part of ensure the intended message is communicated. 

Reference 

Murphy, M. (2014, May 24). What are the benefits and drawbacks of case study reserch? Retrieved from https://socialtheoryapplied.com/2014/05/24/benefits-drawbacks-case-study-research/

The Strengths and Weaknesses of Case Studies. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.universalclass.com/articles/business/a-case-studies-strengths-and-weaknesses.htm

Human Factors, Ethics, and Morality of Remote Warfare

Two decades of regular use in combat have normalized the employment of drones on the battlefield. Though accepted as a component of modern warfare, the use of unmanned systems in battle is not without controversy. While the technical ability to wage war remotely has been proven possible, full consideration for the human factors, ethics, and moral impact of doing so seems lacking at times. There has been healthy debate in recent years, however, on whether drone use in warfare is justifiable in the conduct of military operations.

The ethical and moral issue most commonly associated with drone warfare is the question of whether potential for collateral damage and unintentional civilian injury or death is an acceptable cost of their use in military conflict. Until recently, the United States has had a near-total monopoly on the use of drones in combat, however, nothing guarantees that lead will be maintained with foreign powers quickly catching up in developing UAS capability (Cohen, 2015). For the U.S., significantly lower operating cost, greater endurance, and eliminating risk to pilots all make for compelling justification. Critics of the U.S. policy of drone use focus on evidence that they have unintentionally killed innocents (Shane, 2012). The death of any civilians attributed to warfare is unlikely to ever become acceptable, making the case against armed UAS difficult to argue. The alternatives could be worse, though. 

Bradley J. Strawser, a former Air Force officer and assistant professor of philosophy at the Naval Postgraduate School conducted a concentrated study on the ethics of remotely piloted vehicles in warfare. He initially had doubts and concerns, but concluded the use of unmanned systems to pursue terrorists was not only ethically permissible but also might be obligatory due to the advantages of UAS in positively identifying targets and striking with precision (Shane, 2012). His research points out “all the evidence we have so far suggests that drones do better both at identifying the terrorist and avoiding collateral damage than anything else we have” (Shane, 2012). 

In contrast, the relative ease in which drone strikes are conducted in non-war zones with little question by the public has contributed to the spike in use in recent years. Preemptive strikes with armed UAS carried out in countries like Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen have been preferred over conventional warfare. In Yemen, for example, there have been well over 100 drone strikes over the past dozen years (Mayer, 2016). A thought to consider is if military personnel are not assigned to carry out a mission because the risk is too great and a drone is, then is the mission truly vital (Mayer, 2016)?

Unlike many other aspects of warfare, the ethics and morality of combat drones are debatable. There are compelling arguments that support the use of armed UAS and equally substantial reasons to oppose it. Military drone use itself is complex, and therefore should be evaluated for ethical and moral compliance on a mission by mission basis rather than in general terms. 

Reference 

Cohen, M. (2015, February 16). Is drone warfare ethical? Retrieved from https://www.stanforddaily.com/2015/02/16/is-drone-warfare-ethical/

Mayer, A. (2016, November 25). The ethics of modern warfare. Retrieved from http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2016/11/ethics-warfare-drone/

Shane, S. (2012, July 14). The moral case for drones. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/sunday-review/the-moral-case-for-drones.html

UAS Crew Member Selection

Numerous factors play a role in determining how unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operators are selected. The pace of development and rapid growth of the field of unmanned aviation has resulted in varied thoughts on how unmanned aircrew is selected. The type aircraft, method of control, and payload employed for the mission are just a few of the considerations. Through operational experience and targeted research, the Department of Defense has developed sound methods and criteria for sourcing system operators. Interestingly, though, there are currently no uniform standards for UAS aircrew selection across the branches of the U.S. military (McCarley, & Wickens, n.d.). As UAS move beyond the battlefield to fill civil roles, the organizations that use them are faced with many of the same considerations the military has dealt with when addressing the question of how to select operators. As civil UAS operations expand, the lessons learned by the military that have led to successful selection of aircrew can be equally helpful for civil operators. 

It is imperative to take a holistic approach to staffing unmanned aircraft operators. The logical first step in developing crew requirements is identifying the type of UAS being employed. The systems utilized for the prospective application in question are the General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. (GA-SCI) Ikhana and the Boeing Insitu ScanEagle. Both are civil variants of proven military systems with a well-established operational history. When considering minimum requirements for a multi-platform operation, it would be prudent to assume the more complex of either the standard. The larger, more capable, and arguably more difficult to fly for numerous reasons, is the Ikhana. Basing minimum requirements on the assumption crew will potentially be utilized on both platforms ensures flexibility when needed. The Ikhana is a medium altitude, long endurance (MALE) aircraft capable of serving as a platform for instrumentation and sensors for civil research (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2015). With a wingspan of 66 feet and length of 36 feet, and the capability of flying at altitudes of over 40,000 feet for more than 20 hours, the aircraft is comparable in size and ability to manned platforms. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has operated an Ikhana since 2006. NASA’s pilots, all experienced test pilots, have noted the platform comparatively more challenging to fly than an F-18 (Wallace, 2009). Taking that into consideration, flight crew with substantial experience in a similar platform would be highly recommended. 

The mode or method of control also aids in establishing requirements for aircrew selection. The ground control station (GCS) of the Ikhana, for example, has been characterized as problematic. The UAS seemingly did not benefit from pilot influence on the design of the operator interface (Wallace, 2009). The GCS controls offer no resistance or feedback contributing to artificial feel, and latency can be pronounced depending on which communications method is used for teleoperation (Wallace, 2009). These challenges strengthen the need for experienced flight crew with a high degree of skill. 

Understanding the mission of the UAS is yet another consideration. In this case, the intended use of the system is in support of environmental studies of the ocean. The Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation has researched the utilizing Predator UAS to support maritime patrol, a mission principally similar to oceanic research. As stated in a 2006 study, crewing requirements vary based on the specific role of the system (Defence Science and Technology Organisation, 2006). In addition to the pilot, one or more sensor operators may be required to minimize the potential for task saturation. The need for sensor operators should be established based on the type of sensors in use and the complexity of employing them. 

Of course, regulatory requirements established by Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) should be adhered to as well. In 2007, for instance, the FAA ruled a second-class flight medical certification was sufficient as a requirement for the unmanned aircraft pilot for operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) (Federal Aviation Administration, 2007).

In summary, the crew selected for maritime airborne research with UAS should be, at a minimum, commercial rated fixed-wing pilots with flight experience in aircraft with performance characteristics similar to the Ikhana and ScanEagle aircraft. In order to legally fly within the NAS, they should be able to maintain a second-class FAA flight medical. Familiarity with sensor payload operation is also recommended. The ability to safely operate the platform in integrated airspace should be the priority in these considerations. 

References

Air Force Research Laboratory. (2011). Important and critical psychological attributes of USAF MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper pilots according to subject matter experts. Retrieved from https://timemilitary.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/2011-05-drone-pilot-study-copy.pdf

Defence Science and Technology Organisation. (2006). Unmanned aerial vehicles for maritime patrol: human factors issues. DTSO-GD-0463. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a454918.pdf

Federal Aviation Administration. (2007). Unmanned aircraft pilot medical certification requirements. Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/ua-pilot.pdf

McCarley, J., Wickens, C. (n.d.). Human factors concerns in UAV flight. Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/library/documents/media/human_factors_maintenance/human_factors_concerns_in_uav_flight.doc

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2015, November 16). NASA Armstrong fact sheet: Ikhana Predator B unmanned science and research aircraft system. Retrieved from https://www.nasa.gov/centers/armstrong/news/FactSheets/FS-097-DFRC.html

Thompson, M. (2011, July 18). The “right stuff” for a drone pilot. Retrieved from http://nation.time.com/2011/07/18/the-right-stuff-for-a-drone-pilot/

Wallace, L. (2009, December 2). Remote control: flying a predator. Retrieved from https://www.flyingmag.com/pilot-reports/turboprops/remote-control-flying-predator

Small UAS Operational Risk Management Assessment Tool

Operational Risk Management is a methodical approach to mitigating the risks associated with activities. The methods discussed in Marshall, Barnhart, Hottman, Shappee, & Most’s text details one approach to tackling the task of conducting safety assessments (Marshall, Barnhart, Hottman, Shappee, & Most, 2012). Assessing risks to safe operation should be tailored to the organization. In this entry, we examine the small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) operations of a government agency as an example of organizational safety assessment and development of an operational risk management tool.

For the purpose of this post, the agency will remain anonymous. However, to better understand the operation, the following are organizational and operational characteristics that play a role in how the safety assessment is conducted. The operation uses multiple sUAS, the majority available to consumers and commonly used by commercial sUAS operators. The area operations are conducted in is most frequently within Special Use Airspace, but not exclusively. Organizational guidance is very conservative with many established measures already established to mitigate risk. 

As laid out by Marshall et al., the process begins by establishing a list of potential hazards and assessing the risk they pose to flight operations (Marshall et al., 2012, pp. 124-126). Following the model Preliminary Hazard List and Assessment (PHL/A) discussed in the text, Figures 1-8 highlight considerations for hazards associated with sUAS flight operations conducted by the organization. Hazards are grouped by the phase of flight they affect. All assessments are conducted in accordance with the Department of Defense (DoD) MIL-STD-882D/E. 

Figure 1. Preliminary Hazard List and Analysis conducted for sUAS flight operations, page 1 of 8.

Figure 2. Preliminary Hazard List and Analysis conducted for sUAS flight operations, page 2 of 8.

Figure 3. Preliminary Hazard List and Analysis conducted for sUAS flight operations, page 3 of 8.

Figure 4. Preliminary Hazard List and Analysis conducted for sUAS flight operations, page 4 of 8.

Figure 5. Preliminary Hazard List and Analysis conducted for sUAS flight operations, page 5 of 8.

Figure 6. Preliminary Hazard List and Analysis conducted for sUAS flight operations, page 6 of 8.

Figure 7. Preliminary Hazard List and Analysis conducted for sUAS flight operations, page 7 of 8.

Figure 8. Preliminary Hazard List and Analysis conducted for sUAS flight operations, page 8 of 8.

The next step in the process is to review the known hazards and assess the effectiveness of the mitigation. Marshall et al. use an Operational Hazard Review and Analysis (OHR&A) to clearly review each established hazard and evaluate the effectiveness of control measures (Marshall et al., 2012, pp. 126-127). Figures 9-16 are examples of how the OHR&A may look after conducting and operational review. For this exercise, Operational feedback was not readily available. 

Figure 9. Operational Hazard Review and Analysis conducted for sUAS flight operations, page 1 of 8.

Figure 10. Operational Hazard Review and Analysis conducted for sUAS flight operations, page 2 of 8.

Figure 11. Operational Hazard Review and Analysis conducted for sUAS flight operations, page 3 of 8.

Figure 12. Operational Hazard Review and Analysis conducted for sUAS flight operations, page 4 of 8.

Figure 13. Operational Hazard Review and Analysis conducted for sUAS flight operations, page 5 of 8.

Figure 14. Operational Hazard Review and Analysis conducted for sUAS flight operations, page 6 of 8.

Figure 15. Operational Hazard Review and Analysis conducted for sUAS flight operations, page 7 of 8.

Figure 16. Operational Hazard Review and Analysis conducted for sUAS flight operations, page 8 of 8.

The final step in the safety assessment is to compile identified hazards and craft an Operational Risk Management (ORM) Assessment Tool. For this application, formats vary. The example in Figure 17 is a deviation from the model discussed in the text, however it addresses all the hazards identified in the safety assessment. 

Figure 17. Operational Risk Management Assessment Tool for sUAS flight operations.

In this exercise, we create a an ORM assessment tool. Operational Risk Management is, by design, an ongoing effort intended to evolve to address hazards as they are identified. Periodic update of tools like those presented in this example are require to help mitigate the effects of known hazards. Perhaps the most effective product of the ORM process is the shift in mindset of users to a more proactive approach to safety. 

References

Marshall, D. M., Barnhart, R. K., Hottman, S. B., Shappee, E., & Most, M. T. (Eds.). (2011). Introduction to unmanned aircraft systems. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com

UAS Automatic Takeoff and Landing

Automation is becoming commonplace in all facets of technology. It often proves to be the more precise, efficient, and safe alternative to manual means of control. The aviation industry has come to embrace automation in aircraft systems design and continues to develop the capabilities. Whether in the cockpit of manned aircraft or onboard unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), some degree of automation or automatic function is more common than not. Although formerly reserved for more complex systems, this is no longer the case. Autopilot functionality is an option available to a broad spectrum of manned and unmanned aircraft. Relying on autopilot to fly non-critical portions of flight is a widely accepted practice. In some sectors of aviation it’s the preferred mode of control for enroute flight. Increased capability and precision of component hardware and software technology has granted aircraft designers the ability to move beyond the previous limitation of flight in only non-critical phases. The most current advances in automated flight control have been in enabling aircraft to conduct more complex tasks like takeoff and landing. 

From the perspective of unmanned aircraft, the push to automate these critical phases of flight is much less the source of debate. Many small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) have already incorporated auto takeoff or launch and return to home functions as a standard. Smaller systems capable of launch and recovery from virtually anywhere obviously pose less risk in the event the system does not function as designed. There is interest, though, in bringing this capability to much larger systems that require significantly more precision and reliability. General Atomics Aeronautical Systems (GA-ASI) recently conducted successful demonstration of its Automatic Takeoff and Landing Capability (ALTC) using a Satellite Communications (SATCOM) data link for the proven MQ-9B UAV (Rees, 2018). As a medium altitude, long-endurance (MALE) UAV of significant size, the aircraft is restricted to launching from and returning to airports. The reasoning behind including ALTC in the MQ-9B architecture is two-fold. Primarily, the system reduces pilot workload. This is part of the effort to reposition the human in the loop from direct control to system management. Secondarily, it reduces the need to have the ground control station (GCS) located at the aircraft’s operating base (Rees, 2018). This may seem insignificant but reducing the logistic support requirements has a direct effect on the cost of operation. As GA-ASI puts it, "SATCOM ATLC enables taxi, launch and recovery operations from anywhere in the world and will reduce required aircrew manpower and Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) footprints” (Rees, 2018).

For manned aircraft, the prospect of automated takeoff and landing is a less openly welcomed addition to the cockpit. Boeing only recently began attempts to build commercial airliners that can fly without the requirement of a pilot (Stewart, 2017). Pilots are still currently required to be at the controls of commercial airliners, but the amount of required manipulation of the flight controls varies by where you are in the world. Airlines in the United States require pilots to maintain manual oversight and control, while Asian commercial carriers prefer as much use of autopilot as possible (Stewart, 2017). As an example, Asiana prohibits the captain form manually flying above 3,000 feet (Stewart, 2017). There are also differences in systems engineering by aircraft producer. Design philosophy at Boeing, for instance, differs from Airbus. “Airbus tries to avoid human error; Boeing tries to take advantage of human capability” (Stewart, 2017). Though the technology has been in proven capable for autonomous takeoff, landing, and more, public perception arguably plays the most significant role. Despite the technology being available and ready, convincing the public automated systems for takeoff and landing are safer presents the biggest challenge.

The most critical phases of flight, like takeoff and landing, were preferred to be managed by direct human control until relatively recently. The idea of automated flight from start to finish is gaining acceptance much easier in unmanned aviation. For manned flight, though, the technology may be developed, but regular application may be the subject of resistance. As the systems mature and build a reputation of reliability, public acceptance is likely to follow. 

References

Rees, M. (2018, January 22). GA-ASI demonstrates MQ-9B automatic takeoff and landing. Retrieved from http://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.com/2018/01/ga-asi-demonstrates-mq-9b-automatic-takeoff-landing/

Stewart, J. (2017, June 9). Don’t freak over Boeing’s self-flying plane - Robots already run the skies. Retrieved from https://www.wired.com/story/boeing-autonomous-plane-autopilot/

UAS Shift Work Schedule

Continuous operations require strategic management of all assets in order to maximize efficiency and meet the demands of all assigned missions. Scheduling human resources is one critical component of meeting operational goals that, if done effectively, also addresses risk. Human resource management has direct influe nce on an organization’s ability to operate effectively at a sustained pace for a potentially indefinite duration. The following recommendations are submitted for consideration as a means to optimize current unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operator manning. 

Armed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is the primary mission of the medium altitude, long endurance (MALE) UAS squadron examined for this consultation. Current tasking requires uninterrupted, continuous support. The squadron is divided into four teams of operators and has adopted a continuous shift work schedule of six days on and two days off. Concerns over reports of extreme fatigue while conducting operations due to inadequate sleep as a result of current shift scheduling has necessitated a re-examination of UAS operator scheduling. Current rotational shift scheduling is provided for reference in Figure 1. 

Figure 1.Current six on/two off rotating shift schedule. 

Based on examination of the current strategy, two inferences can be made. The first is a daily limit of flight duties, commonly known as crew day. Based on the schedule, the crew day limit is assumed to be 8.5 hours. The second is the need for overlap for crew turnover. This is currently scheduled for 30 minutes of the 8.5-hour crew day. These two assumptions are considered operational requirements. 

In order to address and mitigate cumulative fatigue over six-day work cycles, a more frequent rotation from day to swing, and subsequently to night offers additional rest during each work week. In this schedule team members transition every two days. Shift transitions are scheduled to allow for longer rest periods. An amended schedule reflecting the suggested modifications is provided in Figure 2.  

Figure 2.Amended six on/two off rotating shift schedule.

The strategy is a compromise of the current schedule and what is termed a fast-rotating shift schedule. The central idea behind a fast-rotating shift schedule is to grant personnel more rest between transitions from one shift to another. The concept was tested with positive results in a 2013 study conducted at a BASF production site. The study concluded “having 24 hours off between day and night shifts might be sufficient to recuperate (given two preceding day shifts in their schedules)” (Fischer, Vetter, Oberlinner, Wegener, & Roenneberg, 2016). The study was based on 12-hour shift work. The 24-hour rest period between the schedule shift was noted as the factor allowing for immediate reduction of acute sleep debt, in turn reducing the build-up of cumulative fatigue.  

A forward rotation of each team’s shifts every two days of nearly 24 hours is recommended as a compromise that allows personnel to remain on a six on/two off schedule while granting more recovery time during the work period. At no time during transitions are personnel scheduled with less than 23.5 hours of recovery time. This schedule allows for optimal crew rest periods without the need for adding personnel. 

In conclusion, the modification in scheduling recommended in this consultation is presented as a solution to current cumulative fatigue issues.

References

Fischer, D., Vetter, C., Oberlinner, C., Wegener, S., & Roenneberg, T. (2016). A unique, fast-forwards rotating schedule with 12-h long shifts prevents chronic sleep debt.Chronobiology International, 33(1), 98-107. doi:10.3109/07420528.2015.1113986

UAS Beyond Line of Sight Operation

Remote operation of aircraft by radio frequency is a well-developed technology. Communication with aircraft by radio signal does, however, have its limitations. As systems become more complex and component technology becomes more capable, the sheer volume of data unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are required to transmit limits which frequency bands may be used. Generally, lower frequency bands propagate further than those of higher frequencies. System engineers are often faced with managing capabilities and limitations. Smaller systems were once inherently tied to line-of-sight (LOS) operations due largely to limited payload capacity, while larger platforms were capable of operations beyond line-of-sight (BLOS), but were more costly. This work focusses on a recently developed system intended to exceed the performance of proven smaller platforms of the past. 

Textron System’s NightWarden UAS is a platform designed to provide greater capability at a lower cost. The system is intended to offer capabilities previously unavailable to platforms meeting Department of Defense (DOD) categorization of Group 3 UAS. The NightWarden is derived from the proven RQ-7 Shadow series aircraft. It expands on the initial RQ-7 limitation to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and targeting mission roles adding strike and electronic attack as possibilities (Warwick, 2017). Additionally, the system offers significantly improved range and endurance, as well as the ability to support BLOS operations (NightWarden(™) TUAS, n.d.). The crew and support requirements remain largely unchanged from the original RQ-7, and the system is designed for a dedicated remote pilot, a sensor/payload system operator, and ground support. The NightWarden maintains approximately 70 percent commonality with current RQ-7 aircraft and support equipment (NightWarden(™) TUAS, n.d.). The command and control (C2) architecture for BLOS operations utilizes existing satellite communications (SATCOM) infrastructure (Warwick, 2017).  

Operators, such as the United States Marine Corps (USMC), effectively extend the operating range of the RQ-7 by utilizing a “hub and spoke” model (United States Marine Corps, 2015). The practice uses two types of sites to employ the system: the hub responsible for launch and recovery, and spoke located closer to the objective area. This was done out of necessity as the RQ-7 had no BLOS capability. The The NightWarden is still capable of supporting this concept, but now allows the launch and recovery site to be much further away from the objective and could minimize the number of “spokes” to cover longer distances. As with larger UAS, launch and recovery are achieved using LOS communication systems, while operations during phases of flight less affected by signal latency can be achieved by SATCOM. Additionally, higher volumes of data generated by high fidelity sensors require greater bandwidth. SATCOM is capable of providing that. 

Switching from LOS to BLOS and back is also a proven practice. There are clear advantages to both communications methods. In short, LOS datalinks are ideal when operations require minimal signal delay, while BLOS datalinks can meet the bandwidth requirements of greater volumes of data and can do so by relaying signals via satellite. In that vein, LOS datalinks are limited in the amount of data that can effectively be transmitted, while BLOS datalinks suffer from latency. From a human factors perspective, transferring control from hub to spoke presents challenges unique to UAS operators.  

While the NightWarden has great potential as a military asset, similar capabilities could prove useful in civil applications. Perhaps one of the most interesting proposals is cited in a recent work published in the Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management.Tatham, Ball, Wu, & Diplas present a strong argument for the use of long-endurance remotely piloted aircraft systems (LE-RPAS) for humanitarian logistic operations. The authors advocate for the use of UAS capable of BLOS operations noting disaster areas may sometimes be unreachable with aircraft limited by LOS datalinks (Tatham, Ball, Wu, & Diplas, 2017). As an example, the 2015 earthquake in Nepal had the most serious effect on the Ghorka region, an area over 100 kilometers from Katmandu, separated by mountainous terrain (Tatham, et al., 2017). A system similar to Textron’s NightWarden could easily find itself filling civil roles in disaster response and humanitarian operations. This, of course, is only one of the countless potential applications of an expanded BLOS capability in smaller UAS. 

References

NightWarden(™) TUAS. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.textronsystems.com/what-we-do/unmanned-systems/tactical-family

Tatham, P., Ball, C., Wu, Y., & Diplas, P. (2017). Long-endurance remotely piloted aircraft systems (LE-RPAS) support for humanitarian logistic operations: The current position and the proposed way ahead.Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management, 7(1), 2-25. doi:10.1108/JHLSCM-05-2016-0018

United States Marine Corps. (2015, December 9). Unmanned Aircraft System Operations(MCWP 3-42.1).Washington D.C., Author. Retrieved from https://www.trngcmd.marines.mil/Portals/207/Docs/TBS/MCWP%203-42.1.pdf?ver=2015-12-15-111528-433

Warwick, G. (2017, June 18). Textron’s NightWarden emerges from Shadow. Retrieved from http://aviationweek.com/paris-air-show-2017/textron-s-nightwarden-emerges-shadow

UAS Integration in the NAS

In the early 2000’s, it became evident air travel congestion was increasing to a level not manageable solely by legislation or incremental upgrades to existing technology alone. A more radical approach was required to address the mounting challenges of ensuring safe air travel within the National Airspace System (NAS). In 2007 the Federal Aviation Administration began implementing a comprehensive plan developed in response to Congressional tasking, known as NextGen, to modernize U.S. Airspace (What is NextGen?, 2018).

The NextGen modernization effort is a multifaceted approach that leverages new technologies and procedures to meet the FAA’s goal of “increasing safety, efficiency, capacity, predictability, and resiliency of American aviation” (What is NextGen?, 2018). A secondary goal of the initiative is to mitigate the negative effects of air travel on the environment (What is NextGen?, 2018). The technologies enabling NextGen include Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), Data Communications (Data Comm), Decision Support Systems (DSS), NAS Voice System (NVS), Performance Based Navigation (PBN), System Wide Information Management (SWIM), and Weather (New Technology, 2018). 

An initial implementation of all component systems is expected to be complete by 2025 (Where We Are Headed, 2017). When the FAA’s NextGen model was envisioned, though, unmanned aircraft were not yet a significant consideration as part of the NAS. The exponential growth of the unmanned aviation sector in the last decade, specifically in small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS), has generated concern for impact to manned aviation. As of May, 2017, 772,000 sUAS operators registered with the FAA (FAA Aerospace Forecasts, 2018). Unmanned aircraft far outnumber manned aircraft registered with the FAA and are expected to continue to proliferate significantly for the foreseeable future. This inherently, requires the FAA to address new challenges associated with expanding sUAS operations within the NAS. 

Unmanned aviation’s growth has seemingly outpaced the ability to regulate the sector initially. Federal, state, and local legislation has been established paving the way for safer operation of UAS in airspace shared with manned aircraft, but integration has not been fully considered and and coordinated by the FAA. The ‘see-and-avoid’ requirement as stated in the Code of Federal Regulations 14, Part 91.113 establishes the need for such a capability (Melnyk, Schrage, Volovoi, & Jimenez, 2014). Efforts have been made to establish minimum operational performance standards for detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems of larger UAS (Thipphavong, 2016). The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the FAA, and industry leaders set initial DAA performance standards with NASA’s Ikhana UAS, a General Atomics Aeronautical System Inc. MQ-9 Predator B (Thipphavong, 2016). This is a significant first step toward integrating airspace. In order to fully integrate the NAS, similar considerations must be made for sUAS. 

From a human factors perspective, operators of both manned and unmanned systems gain advantages from current technological advances. The most obvious being heightened situational awareness. Systems like ADS-B inform pilots of potential threats to safe flight. A potential drawback, though, could be information overload as skies become more populated. For sUAS operators, established sense and avoid performance standards introduce predictability. Broadening the unmanned aircraft’s ability to react predictably autonomously to traffic is an effective way to mitigate human factors issues that may contribute to risks to safety of flight. 

Overall, there is considerable work to be done in further developing the capabilities of unmanned systems to safely navigate airspace without posing a threat to manned aircraft as the NAS becomes integrated.

References

FAA Aerospace Forecasts: Fiscal Years 2018-2038. (2018, March 15). Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/

Melnyk, R., Schrage, D., Volovoi, V., & Jimenez, H. (2014). Sense and avoid requirements for unmanned aircraft systems using a target level of safety approach.Risk Analysis, 34(10), 1894-1906. doi:10.1111/risa.12200

Modernization of U.S. Airspace. (2018, May 29). Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/

New Technology. (2018, May 08). Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/how_nextgen_works/new_technology/

Thipphavong, D. (2016). FAA reaches NextGen, unmanned air milestones. Aerospace America, 54(11), 28.

What is NextGen? (2018, May 07). Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/what_is_nextgen/

Where We Are Headed. (2017, November 21). Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/where_were_headed/